In May and June of 1960 Japan was rocked by some of the largest protests in its history. They erupted over the passage of a revised security treaty between Japan and the United States, titled the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Sōgo Kyōryoku Oyobi Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku), and have become known as the “Anpo” protests from the Japanese shorthand for that treaty. Hundreds of thousands of people came onto the streets day after day, ten million signed petitions against the treaty, thousands were injured, and one person was killed. The protests forced cancellation of a planned visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, toppled the conservative prime minister Kishi Nobusuke, and have come to be recognized as the most significant political crisis of the postwar period.

This unit introduces photographs taken at the peak of the Anpo protests by photographer Hamaya Hiroshi. Sympathetic to the protestors, Hamaya’s photographs allow us to see a great deal about the long-simmering tensions the postwar military alliance with the U.S. engendered within Japan. Since 1951, when it was first signed, the security treaty had been harshly criticized by those who saw it as exposing Japan to unnecessary dangers in the cold war while
undermining the principles of peace and democracy. The prospect of the treaty’s revision and renewal pitted a conservative government, intent on protecting the alliance, against a loose coalition of opposition forces whose aspiration was that Japan become a neutral and unarmed nation—a decisive break with U.S. cold-war policy, and with its own militarist past.

Hamaya, a well-established freelance photographer, was the author of a number of photo books. Soon after the 1960 protests, he became the first Japanese contributor to the Magnum Photos collective. As a subject, the protests are an outlier in his oeuvre, which is otherwise dominated by nature photography and ethnographic studies of life in Japan’s hinterlands. Hamaya’s interest in Anpo was driven primarily by an awareness of the momentousness of the events and a personal sympathy with the aims of the protests. His photographic record begins May 20 and ends on June 22, covering the period when the protests were at their height. It is estimated he took 2,600 photos altogether, which he narrowed down to 203 in preparation for publication as a book. This selection was narrowed further to 138 pictures, and the resulting book—titled Ikari to kanashimi no kiroku (A Record of Rage and Grief)—was published by Kawade Shobō Shinsha in August 1960. Some of Hamaya’s photographs were also published in the French news magazine Paris Match and the Japanese photography journal Camera Mainichi. This unit draws from the pool of 203 photographs.

COLD-WAR JAPAN

World War II ended in disaster for Japan. The final year of the war saw relentless air raids that destroyed 40% of urban areas and culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With Japan’s surrender in August 1945, its vast Asian empire—once spanning from Manchuria to Indonesia—ceased to exist, and Japan itself was left destitute and in ruins. Occupation of the defeated nation began within weeks. Although the occupation was nominally carried out under the aegis of the victorious Allied Powers, in practice it was almost wholly an American affair, with the “supreme commander,” as General Douglas MacArthur was fittingly titled, given “all powers necessary ... to carry out ... the occupation and control of Japan.”

At first, the occupation was fired by the ambitious and idealistic goals of demilitarizing and democratizing Japan. The project went well beyond dismantling the state’s war-making capacity to envision a thorough remaking of government, industry, and civil institutions so that the sources of Japan’s military aggressiveness would be removed at their very roots. The occupation authority, known as SCAP (Supreme Command of the Allied Powers) quickly dissolved the Imperial Army and Navy, issued a civil-rights directive and abolished the notorious Special Higher Police, passed a new Trade Union Law to protect workers’ right to organize, initiated a radical land-reform that would end rural tenancy, and introduced a purge of wartime leaders and ultranationalists that eventually removed 200,000 people from public office.

By 1947, occupation reforms had touched virtually every area of Japanese government and daily life, transforming the criminal and civil codes, liberating women from
patriarchal family law, remaking the structure of public education, and decentralizing governing authority to foster greater local autonomy. The capstone of the drive towards democratization and demilitarization was the new Japanese constitution that came into force in 1947. Drafted by a group of occupation officials after the revisions proposed by Japanese conservative leaders were judged to be too tepid, the 1947 constitution was a model of democratic idealism, more progressive in many ways than the U.S.’s own constitution. It stated explicitly that all people would be equal before the law regardless of “race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin.” It established a right to work and to education. And most famously, in article nine it forever renounced “war as a sovereign right of the nation.”

But the ardor of this commitment to democracy and demilitarization soon faded. By 1947 the cold war dominated U.S. strategic thinking, and the U.S. began to back away from its initial burst of progressive reform in a tectonic shift that has since become known as the “reverse course.” If the intent of the early occupation had been to dismantle the military, economic, and political structures that had made militarism possible, the overarching priority after 1947 became stabilizing Japan politically and economically in the face of the perceived communist threat.

The U.S. now saw Japan as an indispensable link in a defensive chain around East Asia that stretched from the Aleutian Islands, through Japan and Okinawa, to Guam, the Philippines, and South East Asia. As such it became unthinkable that Japan might fall to communism, either through outside attack or domestic insurrection. Social stability and economic reconstruction were to be achieved at all costs, and the new strategic imperative displaced many of the early occupation reforms. The plan to dismantle Japan’s war machine by breaking up powerful concentrations of economic influence barely got off the ground before being scuttled. Of the 325 companies originally slated for possible break-up, by 1948 only 11 were ordered to split, leaving Japanese industry and finance largely unchanged from the war. [3]

The backing for a strong labor movement was also abandoned. The first year of the occupation had witnessed the growth of a spirited and confrontational labor movement which in some instances even took to locking managers out and taking over production. But SCAP made a highly public split with such radical movements in February 1947, when General MacArthur threatened to use occupation troops to put down a long-planned general strike if labor leaders insisted on going forward with it. Labor duly backed down.
On August 19, 1948, Japanese police backed by U.S. military personnel, tanks, and surveillance aircraft arrived at the Toho film studios to evict striking workers who had been occupying the buildings as part of a long-running labor dispute. In the face of this show of force the union vacated the studio without a clash. It is one episode emblematic of the reverse course in occupation policy.

Photograph provided courtesy of Nihon Dokyumento Firumu

By 1949 the global situation was growing more dire and the reverse course intensified. Communist forces in China overwhelmed the Nationalists to establish the People’s Republic in 1949, while the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear-bomb test in the same year. The Korean War erupted in June 1950, pitting the Soviet-supported regime in the north against the U.S.-supported Korean government in the south—drawing the U.S. into the conflict immediately, and China soon thereafter, in December.

In this milieu, U.S. willingness to sacrifice democratic reforms in Japan in the name of security became more pronounced. 1949 saw the beginning of a “depurge,” in which the wartime leaders who had formerly been expelled from public life began to be allowed to return. In the same year, a parallel “red purge” began in which public employees suspected of leftist leanings were summarily removed from office. The purge spread to the private sector in 1950, removing a total of 22,000 people—mostly union activists—from their jobs.

The drive to rationalize the Japanese economy proceeded apace under the stern directorship of newly arrived Detroit banker Joseph Dodge. In the name of rationalization, the so-called “Dodge line” reinvigorated Japan’s largest enterprises—the same ones that had been the main engines of its wartime economy—and encouraged recentralization of economic decision-making. Even article nine’s renunciation of war became an impediment to U.S. interests. Only four years after imposing the “peace constitution,” U.S. planners found themselves pressuring Japan to allow U.S. bases to remain on its soil and to rearm, so that it could begin to participate actively in regional security. Indeed, the U.S. began to see these as conditions for ending the occupation.
It was against this background that the Allied occupation formally and finally came to an end. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, popularly known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was signed by Japan and 47 other nations in September 1951, laying out the terms, widely regarded as generous, for Japan to resume sovereignty in 1952. Only a few hours later on the same day, however, Japan signed a second, bilateral security treaty with the United States. This established the terms of a continued military alliance between the two countries, and locked Japan firmly within the orbit of U.S. cold-war strategy.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signs the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951. 47 other countries also signed the treaty.

A smaller gathering later the same day, when the separate, bilateral U.S.-Japan security treaty was signed.
The terms of the two treaties reflected ongoing U.S. anxieties about the spread of communism in East Asia. The Treaty of Peace excluded key countries, including some of Japan’s most significant neighbors and former enemies. The Soviet Union, Korea, India, and—perhaps most importantly—China were not signatories. Both the Soviet Union and India refused to sign because of objections to the way the attached bilateral security treaty absorbed Japan into the U.S. imperium. Korea and China weren’t invited to the peace conference at all because of disagreement about who should represent them: Korea being in the midst of a civil war, and China split between the People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Japan would soon sign a bilateral peace agreement with Taiwan, but was forced to not establish relations with the mainland as a condition for passage of the peace treaty through the U.S. Senate. The shadow cast by U.S. policy thus limited Japanese autonomy in making peace with former enemies, and establishing foreign relations.

The security treaty was widely regarded as the price that Japan had to pay in order to regain sovereignty. Yoshida Shigeru, the conservative prime minister who negotiated the treaty, understood many of the U.S. demands as non-negotiable: such was U.S. military interest in Japan that had he not agreed to them, the end of the occupation could have been postponed indefinitely. The treaty gave the U.S. the right to maintain military bases in Japan, and Japan was forbidden to grant bases to any third party without prior consultation. When Japan resumed sovereignty in April 1952, 260,000 U.S. servicemen remained in the country, stationed at 2,824 separate facilities. [4]

There was no timetable for their departure. The Ryūkyū islands, including Okinawa, were excluded from the treaty and were to remain under U.S. military occupation, also indefinitely, in what Edwin Reischauer, ambassador to Japan in the early 1960s, later characterized as “the only ‘semi-colonial’ territory created in Asia since the war.” [5]
The unpopularity of the bilateral U.S.-Japan security treaty found dramatic expression in violent May Day demonstrations in Tokyo on May 1, 1952—just days after the occupation of Japan formally ended. Known as “Bloody May Day,” these protests left two protestors dead and 22 with gunshot wounds. Over 2,000 police and protestors were injured. Protests against the ongoing U.S. military presence in Japan continued throughout the decade.

Among other things, the security treaty provided that the U.S. could use its military to put down disturbances within Japan, reflecting the widely held fear on the U.S. side that Japan’s own people might drive it towards communism. Finally, the preamble to the treaty voiced the “expectation” that Japan would assume more responsibility for its own defense, meaning in effect that article nine of the constitution would have to be amended or worked around. At the time of the signing, American officials foresaw Japan creating an army of 325,000 to 350,000 within three years. This represented an enormous expansion, larger than the Japanese Self-Defense Force would ever become in the postwar period. It was only on this final point, Japanese rearmament, that Prime Minister Yoshida had some success resisting U.S. pressure.

Japan was supposed to have emerged from the peace negotiations as an independent state, but the terms of the security treaty were so unbalanced that people referred to it as an “unequal treaty,” while the situation in which it left Japan was similarly described as “dependent independence” or “subordinate independence.” A startling 40% of respondents in a September 1952 Asahi Newspaper poll reported there were times they
felt Japan was not an independent country, and the most common reason given was the presence of foreign troops. Only 18% of the respondents said they believed unreservedly that Japan was independent. [6]

The security treaty was criticized across the political spectrum in Japan, but its most profound effect was to deepen and exacerbate the already deep divide between the political left and right. The political right accepted the overall framework of an anti-communist alliance with the U.S. Their criticisms focused on specific aspects of the treaty such as the lack of an explicit time frame for its revision, the provision that U.S. troops could act to quell domestic disturbances, and the fact that the treaty did not specifically oblige the U.S. to defend Japan. Regarding the expectation that Japan would rearm, Yoshida was aware of the Japanese people’s deep aversion to risking another war, and successfully resisted the precipitous rearmament envisioned by the U.S. Yoshida also saw little reason for the forced isolation from mainland China, believing the Chinese posed no real threat and should be Japan’s most natural trading partners.

Even people further to the right than Yoshida saw need for revision. Kishi Nobusuke, the former accused (but not indicted) war criminal who became prime minister in 1957 and was in office at the time of the Anpo protests, had no reservations about Japanese rearmament. To the contrary, Kishi saw rearmament as a necessary step to Japan becoming a full member of the international order and assuming equality in its relationship with the U.S. For conservatives, therefore, the limits on Japan’s autonomy, the provision on domestic disturbances, the lack of an explicit time frame, and the lack of overall parity between the two parties were the sources of dissatisfaction with the treaty.

Among Japan’s left-wing opposition, objection to the treaty was more fundamental. It was not simply the problem of parity, but a rejection of the wisdom and necessity of the treaty’s most basic tenet—the military alliance with the United States—that underlay their dissatisfaction. To a range of groupings from communists to socialists to progressive public intellectuals, Japan did not have to choose either the Soviets or the U.S., but could exist as a neutral nation. Such a position would necessitate making peace with all of Japan’s neighbors, avoiding bilateral military pacts, forbidding military bases on Japanese soil, and following the letter and spirit of article nine by refusing rearmament.

The Socialist Party settled on these as its four “Principles of Peace” between 1949 and 1951, and similar ideas were endorsed by a large group of highly respected and influential intellectuals known as the Peace Problems Symposium (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai). In a series of articles published in the mass-circulation monthly Sekai (World), this group spelled out the dangers of a separate peace and overreliance on the United States while arguing for a policy of strict unarmed non-alignment under the protection of the United Nations. The basic security argument was this: the bilateral relationship and U.S. bases in Japan put Japan in great danger in the event that the U.S. got into a war. Japan could be sucked into the conflict and potentially become a target of (nuclear) retaliation. Maintaining neutrality was ultimately safer for Japan.

This criticism of the alliance, moreover, went beyond security to include concerns about internal politics as well as broader ones about Japan’s identity and direction. To those
on the left, the security treaty represented a dangerous backslide towards militarism, authoritarianism, and war—a mere half decade or so after Japan’s last prolonged and disastrous experience with these.

The ideals of peace and democracy could not be separated easily. The reverse course, initiated by the occupation and taken up with gusto by a succession of conservative governments, entailed Japan’s remilitarization both literally and economically. Only one month after the beginning of the Korean War, Prime Minister Yoshida inaugurated a modestly named National Police Reserve (Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai), a 75,000-strong force trained by U.S. advisors and armed with U.S. weaponry, including M1 rifles, machine guns, mortars, bazookas, flame throwers, artillery, and tanks (known as “special vehicles”). [7]

The Korean War also rekindled Japan’s military industrial capacity. The economic windfall brought about by “special procurement” contracts with the U.S. gave such a critical boost to Japan’s languishing economy that Yoshida and other conservatives referred to the war as a “gift from the gods.” The sudden rise in the demand for military goods reanimated Japan’s factories and economic structures and fostered closer relations between government and large industries.

Because of the constitution’s article nine, the naming of Japan’s postwar armed forces was a sensitive issue. When Prime Minister Yoshida inaugurated the force in 1950 it was called the National Police Reserve (Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai). In 1952 it was renamed the National Safety Forces (Hōantai), and in 1954 it became the Self Defense Forces (Jieitai). Here the Hōantai march in Tokyo’s downtown shopping area, the Ginza, in October 1952.

From the Mainichi Shimbun

Remilitarization went hand in hand with a conservative push to “correct the excesses” of the early occupation by rolling back democratic reforms. In autumn 1951, almost simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Conference, Yoshida presented legislation titled the Subversive Activities Prevention Law that was designed to protect Japanese society from subversion after the end of the occupation. The law would have outlawed strikes, regulated public gatherings, and instituted a press code. Fierce opposition from the left eventually gutted the law of most of its provisions, but the battle over it was only the first in a series of many similar confrontations over the coming decade.

Across the decade of the 1950s, family law and women’s rights, centralization of the school system and curricula, the extent of police powers and civil liberties, and of course the relationship with the United States were all occasions for bitter clashes between consecutive conservative governments and a shifting coalition of opposition groups that drew from the Socialist and Communist Parties, unions, women’s groups, students, and
leading intellectuals. It would not be going too far to say that these battles were for the soul of Japan, waged between conservatives—who saw the occupation reforms as overzealous, and hoped to return to a system closer to that of wartime—and those who embraced the progressive ideals of neutrality, peace, and democracy, and wished to make them the foundation of a new nation that had made a decisive break with its militarist past. The 1960 Anpo protests were by far the largest of these ongoing confrontations.

Although the Socialist and Communist Parties, along with influential progressive intellectuals, were the most visible leaders of the peace and democracy movements of the 1950s, one must not overlook the extent to which these ideals tapped broad sympathy on the part of the Japanese public. Article nine, for instance, enjoyed a plurality of support through most of the postwar period, including substantial majorities of 60 to 90% from the 1960s to the 1980s. Peace movements were tremendously vibrant at the grassroots. [8] Workers, women, and students had particular prominence in these movements, and their thinking and action reveal how the broad ideals of peace and democracy were brought down to the level of everyday life.

For workers, the event that most forcefully brought the international situation together with everyday labor issues was the Korean War. Workers in the factories that supplied the U.S. war effort were faced with the uncomfortable reality that their livelihood was directly connected with a war in a neighboring Asian country, a scant five years after Japan’s own misadventures in Korea and Asia had come to an end. One 18-year-old worker who found work at a munitions plant after a long period of unemployment was forced to quit after two weeks of sleepless nights, unable to bear the thought that he was producing bullets that would kill Koreans. [9]

The war boom, although good for the economy as a whole, also went hand in hand with crackdowns on union organizers and dramatic increases in workload. This conjunction radicalized many unions and made the security relationship with the U.S. an issue of concern. The Japanese longshoremen’s union (Zenkōwan) was one of the few to defy an occupation ban and go on strike in protest of their workers’ forced participation in the war effort. They accused the U.S. of carrying out a “war of aggression” in Korea and connected their struggle for better working conditions with the fight against “the conspiracy of international imperialists, rearmament, war, and colonial policy.” [10] This was when unions began to call their first “political” strikes, meaning strikes that had political—rather than work-related—goals.

Three general strikes held in June 1960 as part of the Anpo protests were all strikes of this kind, carried out to topple the Kishi government and block passage of the revised security treaty. The largest, on June 22, involved 6.2 million workers according to Sōhyō (Japan’s General Council of Trade Unions), and was one of the largest strikes in Japanese history. [11]
A member of the All Japan Garrison Forces Labor Union (Zen Chūryūgun Rōdō Kumiai, or Zenchūrō) participating in a protest in front of the American embassy on June 11, 1960. This union united Japanese workers who worked in a variety of support functions at U.S. bases.

[anp7142]

June 22, 1960. Striking rail workers sit on an idle train in a yard in Tokyo. The signs attached to the side of the car read “Against Anpo,” one of the most common slogans of the protest. The general strike on June 22 was the third strike that month. It involved 6.2 million workers and shut down the trunk line running from Tokyo to Osaka for the first time in history.

[anp7192]
Women entered the peace movement in large numbers in response to an incident that occurred in 1954. In March of that year a Japanese tuna fishing vessel named the Lucky Dragon #5 was caught in the radioactive fallout from a U.S. hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific, resulting in the death of one crew member from radiation sickness. News that the ship’s cargo had been distributed to markets around Japan created a scare about the safety of the food supply, and six U.S. bomb tests over the subsequent two-and-a-half months kept the fear alive. The incident was sometimes referred to as Japan’s third nuclear bombing, and brought Japan’s continuing exposure to the gathering nuclear arms race to public consciousness. It sparked signature campaigns demanding a ban on nuclear weapons that began at the local level, led primarily by housewives who stood at their local markets or used connections with the PTA and local governments to circulate petitions.

The politicization of women in these movements often hinged on their identity as caregiver and protector of the family. The danger that first brought the issue home was contaminated fish, but this subsequently broadened into the danger of being caught up in another war. Opposing war for the sake of one’s children struck a chord with huge numbers of housewives who had lived through the devastation of World War II, and what began as a grassroots initiative quickly grew into Japan’s largest anti-nuclear movement, the Japan Council Against A- and H- Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai, or Gensuikyō). By August 1955, just over a year after its birth, the movement had gathered nearly 32.4 million signatures against the bomb—roughly one third of the Japanese population at the time. [12] Gensuikyō, as well as dozens of women’s organizations, were major constituents of the Anpo protests.
A farmer, part of a group from Nagano Prefecture, participates in a protest in front of the American embassy on June 11, 1960.
Protestors from Shizuoka Prefecture join demonstrations in Tokyo on June 11.

Families with children participate in a rally on June 18. One child has a message attached to him that speaks in the child’s voice. Though part of the sign is obscured it probably reads something like “I hate war” (Boku wa sensō ga iya da). Many parents were politicized around the security treaty issue through their role as protectors of their children. For the people demonstrating here, the Anpo treaty was taken to be a threat to the safety of their families.

Students are a final group who played a pivotal role in the 1960 Anpo demonstrations. Zengakuren (Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sōrengō, or All Japan League of Self-Governing Student Associations) was the most important network of student activists. After forming in 1948 out of a movement to resist U.S. “imperialism” in reforming the university system, it would remain a formidable bastion of anti-American sentiment and left-wing politics throughout the postwar.

Zengakuren students tended towards radical views and direct action. They lent moral and physical support to struggles across the 1950s including the red purges, the Korean War, and anti-U.S. base movements. The conflict over the proposed runway extension at the Tachikawa airbase near Tokyo was the most dramatic of these. Local farmers protecting their fields—pitted against the weight of Japanese officialdom carrying out the demands of the U.S. bases—came to serve as symbolic stand-ins for Japan: condensations of an enduring injustice whereby American military expansionism, assisted by Japanese authorities, preyed on local communities. Students and radical
union members clashed with police many times as part of these struggles, as they would again during the Anpo protests. [13]

**Student Opposition**

*Students were among the most radical participants in the Anpo protests, leading them to frequent violent confrontations with the police. The following three photos depict an incident on June 3, when a group of a few thousand Zengakuren students broke into the prime minister’s official residence.*

*A photographer standing on the wall as he records the scene mirrors Hamaya’s own angle of vision—a “looking down from above” perspective that characterizes many of his depictions of the demonstrations.*
In a fateful moment on June 15, students stormed the south gate of the Diet (parliament) building, eventually forcing their way in. Here they are met with police water cannon.

War memory was a key ingredient in grassroots opposition to the security treaty. The final years of World War II had brought the horror of war home to Japan, witnessed the first use of atomic weapons, and ended with the country destitute, ruined, and occupied. The awareness of shared suffering during the war had a tendency to blind Japanese public discourse to the suffering its own empire had inflicted on others, but by the same token it generated a keen focus on the disaster awaiting Japan were it to get dragged into another war.

The unpredictable perils of the cold war were lent terrifying reality by the shadow of World War II; the nuclear brinkmanship of the 1950s sent regular ripples of anxiety through Japanese society each time the precariousness of its position was exposed. Support for neutrality, as opposed to alliance with the U.S., grew stronger through the 1950s. In 1950, 22% of those polled supported neutrality, with 55% supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 1953, the figures were 38% and 35% respectively, and by 1959 support for neutrality had risen to 50%, while only 26% of respondents supported the military alliance. In 1960, on the eve of the Anpo protests, 59% supported neutrality and only 14% expressed support for the military alliance. [14]
Though they were diverse and difficult to summarize, a general observation can be made about these popular engagements with peace and democracy. While peace and democracy functioned as broad ideals, they could also become local and often nationalist when people imagined their relevance to their daily lives. Workers saw their position in society as being tied up with the reconstruction of Japanese industry under U.S. military hegemony, women were motivated by a desire to protect and sustain their family’s way of life, while students were fired by out-and-out anti-Americanism and disgust at Japan’s conservative leaders.

The movements built an understanding of peace and democracy as things that had real consequences in the context of daily life, and tended towards action within that context. One of the great achievements of Hamaya Hiroshi’s documentation of the Anpo protests is to give us sustained access to the protests as they played out at that level, across the faces and lives of ordinary people for whom peace and democracy were a complex mixture of the high-minded and concrete, calling forth aspirations and anxieties that embraced the global while remaining highly local, even intimate.
Serious discussion of revising the security treaty began in the late 1950s. By then Japan was a different country than it had been in 1951 when Yoshida negotiated the first treaty. Phenomenal economic growth through the 1950s (7% on average between 1952 and 1958, and 13% from 1959 to 1961) had given people renewed confidence and optimism about the future. On the international stage Japan normalized relations with the Soviet Union in 1956 (without concluding a peace treaty) and joined the United Nations the same year. These changes made the “unequal treaty” of 1951 seem increasingly inappropriate. Added to this were new doubts as to the relative strength of the United States. While conservatives had long argued that the alliance made Japan safer, the Soviet's spectacular success in launching Sputnik in 1957 sowed doubts about whether Japan had really sided with the winner. Thus the debate over a revised security treaty threatened to reopen all of the basic questions about Japan’s identity and place in the world.

The new treaty, negotiated by Prime Minister Kishi, answered some of the criticisms of the previous security treaty. It obligated the U.S. to “act to meet the common danger” should Japan be attacked. It established that the U.S. would “consult” Japan before launching attacks on enemies from bases in Japan. It removed the clause on domestic disturbances. It squarely acknowledged the primacy of the U.N. charter. And it had a time limit of 10 years, after which either side could dissolve it.

Nevertheless, much doubt remained and, as the debate over ratification wore on in the Diet through winter and spring of 1960, public skepticism mounted. A blizzard of books, pamphlets, and magazines raised serious questions about the new treaty. Did the promise that the two parties would “consult” actually give Japan any veto power over U.S. troop movements in Asia? Didn’t this risk embroilment in a foreign conflict? Why not limit the mission of U.S. forces in Japan to the protection of Japan? Did “act[ing] to meet a common danger” in fact commit the U.S. to defend Japan? Wasn’t 10 years too long a time in such a fast-changing world? Why didn’t the Japanese government insist on banning nuclear weapons? As the questions multiplied, it began to seem the new treaty left Japan’s position little changed from the old one.

An organized opposition called the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty (Anpo Jōyaku Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi) provided an umbrella for hundreds of organizations that were opposing the new treaty. Growing out of the many citizen movements of the 1950s, the opposition under the People’s Council was broad and
varied. When the council formed in March 1959 it counted 134 organizations among its members, but by the following March this had grown to 1,633 affiliated organizations, including labor unions, farmers’ and teachers’ unions, student groups, women’s organizations and mothers’ groups, the Socialist and Communist Parties, anti-nuclear organizations, poetry circles, theater troupes, and a plethora of others. [15]

The long-running opposition mounted by the People’s Council was significant, centering around “united actions” (tōitsu kōdō) during which its constituent organizations held rallies, strikes, and protests around the country. But this alone does not account for the scale of the events that erupted in May and June, 1960. An estimated 16 million people took part in anti-treaty protests between the spring of 1959 and the fall of 1960. [16] Roughly half of these were concentrated in May and June 1960, however—a massive popular upsurge that outstripped any organization’s claim of leadership. [17] The trigger for the upsurge was events that unfolded in the Diet on the night of May 19, 1960.

In January, Prime Minister Kishi traveled to the U.S. to meet with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and sign the revised treaty. During the visit, Eisenhower promised to visit Japan in June, by which time Kishi hoped to have the treaty ratified by the Diet. But opposition both inside and outside the Diet successfully delayed the ratification for months. Many saw Kishi’s subsequent attempt to push the treaty through the Diet as being timed to coordinate with Eisenhower’s visit. If Kishi hoped to have the treaty ratified by late June, it would have to pass the lower house of the Diet by late May. According to law, if the treaty passed the lower house, it would automatically be ratified one month later without having to pass through the upper house, so long as the Diet remained in session. Thus Kishi calculated that if he could get the treaty through the lower house by May 19, it would automatically be ratified one month later.

On May 19 the opposition parties in the Diet used all kinds of tactics to delay the parliamentary process, including eventually blockading the speaker inside his office so that he could not reach the podium to call a vote. In order to restore enough order to pass a vote to extend the Diet session, conservative party leaders resorted to calling the police into the Diet building to remove opposition party members. The police picked up members of the opposition four to a man, and physically carried them out of the building one by one. With all the opposition members gone, the conservatives easily passed a resolution to extend the Diet session for one month, and then, within a matter of minutes, voted to pass the revised security treaty. The treaty was then set to become law one month later, so long as the Diet stayed in session.

The high-handed approach to the passage of the treaty, which seemed to demonstrate Kishi’s contempt for the democratic system, sparked a massive upsurge of popular disapproval. The Communist and Socialist Parties began a boycott of the Diet the next day, and headlines in the newspapers declared that the conservatives had passed the treaty “unilaterally.” [18] Even some members of the ruling Conservative Party who had been unaware of Kishi’s plan were shocked by his tactics. [19] Kishi’s actions widened the issue of Anpo so that it now became not only a question of peace, autonomy, and Japan’s place in the world, but also a challenge to Japan’s democracy.
Hamaya’s account of the Anpo protests begins on May 20, the day after the ruling conservatives pushed the revised security treaty through the Diet. Here students clash with police. Hamaya’s caption describes this as part of a protest action organized by the People’s Council, which “encircled the Diet and cried out for democracy.”

To understand the hopes and fears that fueled the Anpo protests, it is helpful to concentrate on the figure of the prime minister himself. Kishi often appeared in effigy, and calls for him to resign were some of the most common messages on protestors’ signs.

Calls for Prime Minister Kishi’s resignation were among the most common protest messages. Here the phrase “Out Kishi!” has been scrawled on the outer wall of his official residence.
There was a reason for the concentration of anger around Kishi; he had a history with which most people in Japan in 1960 did not want to identify. Born in 1896 to an elite former samurai family, Kishi entered government in the 1920s, and rose quickly through the ranks to become the minister of commerce and industry during the war. As a member of General and Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki’s cabinet, he had signed the declaration that opened the Pacific War. When the war ended in defeat, Kishi was purged along with other wartime leaders by order of SCAP. He was subsequently imprisoned as a suspected “class-A” war criminal at Sugamo Prison but never indicted or brought to trial, as cold-war concerns led U.S. authorities to abandon the prosecution of war crimes after 1948. The fact that a suspected war criminal would become prime minister in 1957, less than a decade after being released from prison, enraged those who wanted to believe Japan had turned a corner after the end of the war. His actions on May 19 only served to heighten people’s anger and fear, forcing them to face the uncomfortable possibility that Japan had not come so far from its wartime past.

**Kishi’s Controversial Journey**

*Much of the rage of demonstrators in Tokyo in mid 1960 was personally directed at Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, whose heavy-handed tactics pushing treaty renewal through Japan’s parliament were seen as doubly onerous and ominous. On the one hand, Kishi’s actions threatened Japan’s fragile postwar democracy. On the other hand, they were a reminder of his influential role in promoting Japan’s recent aggression and oppression in Asia.*

*Although U.S. occupation authorities arrested Kishi as an accused war criminal in 1946 and incarcerated him in Sugamo Prison, he was released from prison in 1948 without being indicted. He returned to politics in 1952 as soon as the U.S. occupation ended, was elected to the Diet in 1953, and became prime minister as head of the recently formed Liberal Democratic Party in 1957.*
Kishi (indicated by circle) as a newly appointed member of the war cabinet of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, October 1941. He served as minister of commerce and industry until the end of the war in 1945.

Kishi’s “mug shot” after he was arrested by U.S. occupation authorities and incarcerated in Sugamo Prison along with other accused and indicted Japanese war criminals.

President Dwight Eisenhower looks on as Kishi signs the draft revised security treaty in Washington on January 19, 1960. The month-long demonstrations that convulsed Tokyo beginning on May 20 erupted after Kishi summoned the police to remove obstreperous opposition politicians and rammed this new treaty through the Diet on May 19.
Opponents of the treaty frequently attacked Kishi personally. One sign in this crowd of protestors tells Kishi to “Go Back to Sugamo.” Another sign (at bottom, center) uses the emphatic katakana script to voice a more primal feeling: “I Hate Kishi.”
Protestors flaunt a grotesque likeness of Kishi’s impaled head sticking out a double tongue—symbolic of both his duplicitous “forked tongue” and his more general ominous image in the eyes of the protestors. He was sometimes referred to as the “monster” or “ghost” (yōkai) of the Showa era. [20]

In addition to rearmament, Kishi’s administration seemed intent on bringing back other aspects of the wartime state. In 1956, a major reform to education law reestablished centralized control over school curricula, and in 1958 Kishi attempted, but failed, to pass a reform to police law that would have given police wide powers to carry out preventative detention. Against this background, Kishi’s decision to pass the controversial new security treaty by having opposition members forcibly removed from the Diet sent a shockwave through the country. One leading progressive intellectual at the time, Tsurumi Shunsuke, declared that the struggle over Anpo was nothing less than a battle between two nations: that of prewar and that of postwar Japan. [21]

Beyond the signs held by protestors and beyond the figure of Kishi himself, we can see the specter of prewar Japan in some of Hamaya’s portrayals of the police. They are often photographed behind barbed wire barricades or in formation, their riot helmets giving them a paramilitary appearance. In one of his most iconic images, Hamaya shoots from behind police lines, capturing the confrontation between the uniform mass of helmets and a varied group of protesters, whose individual faces are all clearly visible. It centers on one man shouting at the impassive mass of police, the voice of one person against an armed, organized, and apparently indifferent state force.
Protestors confront police on June 3, 1960. This iconic print, seen in full as the signature graphic for this unit, is shown here slightly cropped (top and bottom) by Hamaya himself. His composition establishes just the right intermediary scale; we can imagine the crowd of police and protestors extending far beyond the frame, but we're brought back to focus on one man.

[anp7025]
SITES OF PROTEST

Hamaya’s photographs of the Anpo protests form a unique record shaped by his style as a photographer, his understanding of the protests, and his literal positioning in relation to the events he was photographing. By all accounts he began covering the protests out of a sense of solidarity with the protestors and an awareness that he was living through a historical moment. His afterword to the published Japanese selection of his photos of the demonstrations is a heartfelt indictment of factionalism and money politics and a defense of the student protestors—whom many others criticized for their extremism—as a natural outcome of government that excludes the voice of the people. “It wasn’t international communism that created the students the government saw as enemies, but Japanese politics and the institutionalized violence (bōryokushugi) among Japan’s politicians.”

It was these convictions that drove Hamaya to follow the protests with such energy. He demonstrates a preternatural ability to be present at their most intense moments, and as the protests grew he got ever more caught up in their trajectory, often not returning home.

During the protests, Hamaya was assisted by Kurihara Tatsuo, a student at Waseda University and member of the photo club. Kurihara introduced Hamaya to some of the leaders of the radical student organization Zengakuren. The photo to the left is probably at Waseda, inside Zengakuren offices. The banner on the ceiling is from a labor union congratulating the students on the recent release of nine of their members from police custody. Below, students gather at Waseda University on June 3.
The events that Hamaya covered in May and June correspond to the major episodes that feature in most histories of the protests. He begins with a student demonstration on May 20, the day after Kishi’s actions in the parliament, a day that saw many protests. He follows the marches, rallies, and signature campaigns that were part of the People’s Council’s united actions. He was on the scene at Haneda Airport on June 10, when Eisenhower’s press secretary James Hagerty was mobbed by protestors and trapped for almost an hour inside his car. He records moments from the three nationwide general strikes of June 4, June 15, and June 22.

Hayama’s devotion to recording the experience of the protestors is most evident in his proximity to the turbulent events of June 15. The protests on this day were some of the largest and most violent. Students of Zengakuren broke into the Diet compound through the south gate, clashing with police many times in the process. Hamaya remained through the entire confrontation, capturing a moment that was to become a great turning point in the protests.

In the days following, he was attendant at the mourning ceremonies for Kanba Michiko, a female student who was killed in the clashes of the 15th. Scenes of mourning for her blend into dispirited reactions when the treaty passed into law on June 19. But Hamaya ends his account on an upbeat note, with the general strike on June 22, where he shows how the spirit of democratic struggle had not been extinguished.

One of the recurrent tactics of the protestors was to insert themselves into places where their presence would disrupt the forces that lay behind the Anpo treaty. In many of these places Hamaya’s photographs portray the protestors tearing down gates and scaling walls, refusing to be held by barriers to participation. The most startling example of protestors inserting themselves into places and processes they were never invited to was during Press Secretary Hagerty’s visit to Japan.
The Hagerty Incident

On June 10, President Eisenhower’s press secretary James Hagerty arrived to work out plans for the president’s upcoming visit to celebrate the revised security treaty coming into effect. While attempting to leave the airport at Haneda to go to the U.S. embassy, Hagerty’s car was mobbed by protestors and he had to be rescued by a Marine helicopter.

This incident alarmed official Washington and led the Kishi government to cancel Eisenhower’s visit out of fear that it might be marred by similar protests. This humiliating turn of events did not prevent the treaty from coming into effect, but it did prompt Kishi’s June 19 resignation as prime minister.
The crowd surrounds Hagerty’s limousine and prevents it from moving. The “Break Down Lower House” banner in the foreground (displayed by a day-laborer union from Tokyo’s Shibuya ward) is an appeal for dissolution of the Diet. This would have prevented the ratification of the security treaty that Kishi rammed through the parliament on May 19 from automatically going into effect.

[anp7131]
Eisenhower’s envoys are rescued by a U.S. Marine helicopter after being immobilized by the mob for almost an hour.

The protestors at Haneda were joined by a conspicuously smaller contingent of conservative and right-wing counter-protestors waving American and Japanese flags as well as signs of welcome. Both sides were acutely aware of the international press coverage Hagerty’s visit was attracting, and used English as well as Japanese in their placards and banners.

Protestors urge Hagerty to “go away.”
Flag-waving supporters of the revised treaty welcome Eisenhower’s advance party “with open arms.”
On June 11, the day following the debacle at Haneda, protestors gathered at the prime minister’s official residence, where Kishi and Hagerty were meeting. Hamaya’s photos of this demonstration include exuberant students kicking at the graffiti-smeared wall of the compound.

The most important focal point for demonstrations was the National Diet, whose ziggurat-like structure would figure in many photographs and artistic representations of Anpo over the decades. In Hamaya’s photos, the Diet and its immediate surroundings appear in a number of different attitudes. Although the house of Japan’s representative democracy, in one photo it rises behind a wall formed by police trucks with wooden barriers attached to them. Framed on a slight angle, the seat of Japanese democracy appears to have been knocked off balance. In another photo, taken from a similar position, the space in the foreground has been filled with a group of protestors sitting down, apparently listening to a speech off-camera. The Diet stands straight at the exact center of the background as if this is its proper place, surrounded and protected by the people.
In this photo of the Diet building blockaded by police trucks with wooden barriers attached to them, Hamaya’s slightly off-balance composition conveys a deliberate sense of democratic disequilibrium.
This photograph illustrates two consistent features of Hamaya’s technical and stylistic approach: his framing of crowds so that they overrun the picture frame, and his use of deep focus. Framing the images this way makes it difficult to judge a crowd’s size, and raises questions about how the group relates to the spaces around it. Deep focus, which keeps all planes in focus from foreground to background, captures the size of some crowds, and allows the viewer to pick out individuals; the crowd appears as a collection rather than an undifferentiated mass.

A crowd of protestors listening to a speech sits squarely in front of the Diet building, as if they were its democratic defenders. The banner on the left indicates that they are members of the Communist Party.

One can see Hamaya’s decision working clearly by comparing two versions of a shot in which a group parades down one of the main thoroughfares of the Ginza, Tokyo’s upscale shopping district. If we compare the original shot with the one that Hamaya included in his photo book, we can see how his cropping of the picture has reframed it significantly. While the un-cropped picture simply shows a crowd walking down a street in the Ginza, in the cropped picture the crowd itself defines the ground, unmooring the lights in the background so that they seem to stand on a sea of people. More often than not, the people in Hamaya’s photos are not attacking barriers, but simply taking over the space they have chosen to occupy. The crowds of people become the center of attention, and simply in their overwhelming presence they redefine the space’s functioning.
As seen in this juxtaposition, the powerful impact of Hamaya's images often reflected his skill at cropping photos in a manner that emphasized the presence of the crowds.

left: Original photograph
below: Cropped version
If people from all walks of life came into familiar spaces to complicate them with their presence, the protests also went the other way, infiltrating the more mundane spaces of daily life. During the three general strikes of June, people all over the country participated in political movements from their workplaces. Workers at Tokyo’s central post office threw paper out of the windows, almost like tickertape, and the caption in Hamaya’s book tells us that there was a crowd of protestors below them. The protests were not only on the street, but also at offices, shops, and train stations. The strikes were particularly significant because they did not include any labor demands; they were purely out of sympathy with the demands of the protests. The main industrial unions were joined by large numbers of small shop owners who also decided to shut down.

left: On June 4, workers at Tokyo’s central post office throw paper out of the windows in support of the protests. This was the first of three general strikes that month.

below: Shopkeepers showed solidarity with strikers and protestors by shutting down their businesses. Here, a group of shopkeepers march on June 18.
In one photo, youngsters on the way to school stop to add their signatures to a petition against the treaty. Thus, while the Anpo protests were fought over fundamental issues of democracy, international alignment, and peace, they reached deep into the everyday places where people lived their lives. They were both an expression of, and a forum for, people’s understanding of how these issues touched their own lives.
Schoolchildren add their names to a signature campaign against the treaty.
Hamaya’s primary subject is people, and for the most part they are not politicians or well-known personages. With the exception of James Hagerty, and a few shots of Asanuma Inejirō, leader of the Socialist Party, the people in Hamaya’s photographs are simultaneously anonymous and individual. A number of the photos were taken at rallies. But almost without exception they ignore the stage, the “front” of the rally, to concentrate instead on the faces of the people in the crowd.
The question of who the protestors were and why they were protesting was politically fraught. Kishi portrayed the protests as “riots,” and the protestors as a violent “mob.” Other officials claimed that the protestors were under the sway of Moscow. This claim was echoed in most of the coverage of the protests in the U.S. and U.K. The New York Times ran an editorial on June 13, claiming “the real authors of these demonstrations have been hard-core communists and left-wing socialists mouthing ultra-communist slogans,” while Britain’s Sunday Times ran an article on June 19 titled “20 Communists Directed Tokyo Week of Riots.” [23]

On May 28, Kishi met with reporters for the first time after forcing the revised treaty through the Diet. He famously coined the phrase “voiceless voices” to refer to what he imagined to be the silent majority of Japanese opinion that was not being heard among the din of protests. Incensed, the major newspapers all published scathing editorials the next day, taking issue with Kishi. [24] Seemingly contradicting the argument that the noisy protestors obscured more general support, an Asahi newspaper poll taken on May 25 and 26 showed approval ratings for Kishi’s cabinet to be just 12 percent—the lowest of any prime minister to that point in postwar Japan. [25] Protestors quickly adopted the phrase voiceless voices to refer to themselves. They also began to refer to themselves as “average citizens” (ippan shimin) to capture the idea that protesting did not make them exceptional. They were regular people, responding as concerned parties to the situation.

Hamaya was highly aware of these controversies and criticized the idea that Japan’s voiceless majority supported Kishi in the afterword to the collection of photos he published in Japanese. His distrust of U.S. media coverage led him to refuse a request for his photographs from Life magazine and to send them instead to the French publication Paris Match. [26] His approach to the Anpo protests is also marked by his endeavor to portray the variety of the protestors’ backgrounds. There are men and women, children and elderly, people from all walks of life.
High-school students join the protests on June 11.

[anp7136]
This man holds what appears to be a People’s Republic of China flag. Judging by his sash, which reads “Japanese resident,” he is probably a Chinese national residing in Japan.

In one picture, protestors from a rural area near Mt. Fuji have gathered in Tokyo in preparation for the enormous protests of June 15. They wear rustic hats proclaiming where they’re from, and carry reed signs reminiscent of feudal-era peasant rebellions. The area they were from was the site of a major U.S. maneuvering ground, which had itself seen a long-running local protest against it. U.S. military bases in Japan were the source of a range of social and environmental ills for the communities that hosted them, and came to symbolize the inequality in the relationship between Japan and the U.S. Hamaya’s photo captures how these protestors consciously put forward a self-image as plain old folk participating in the protests out of good sense, to protect the “mountains and water” of their home.
Residents of a rural area near a U.S. maneuvering ground come to Tokyo on June 15 to lend their voices to the protests. Their straw hats and slogans written on woven reed mats hark back to peasant protests and rebellions of the feudal era.

Camaraderie

People who participated in the demonstrations and strikes sometimes testified to feeling an unusual ease among strangers—an ability to talk and share with others that went beyond the everyday arrangement of things. That camaraderie, among strangers as well as acquaintances, comes through in many of Hamaya’s photographs.
Hamaya seems relatively uninterested in using formal compositions to enhance the graphic or iconic impact of the events. He does not emphasize the iconicity of the people and places he is photographing. The Diet building or the lights of Ginza may appear, but they are secondary to the crowds moving around them. Major politicians and intellectuals are almost absent. What we encounter instead, over and over, is regular people. Although the historical moment they were participating in was anything but run-of-the-mill, Hamaya’s photos generally refuse to turn them visually into heroes. Although they have moved outside their usual places and routines to demonstrate their ideas and convictions about issues of great significance, they are nevertheless still everyday people.

From one perspective we may think of this as a result of the realities of photographing an unfolding event. Nobody including Hamaya could see where the events were leading, or which of the events would later be seen to have had particular significance. There is thus no visual center of gravity that runs through Hamaya’s photographs. Instead, he is fundamentally following the protestors, and not assuming a perspective that would put him ahead of them. Beyond the realities of recording a developing event, however, we may see this quality in his photographs as involving a positive statement, a conviction, on Hamaya’s part. Insofar as his primary subject was people—simultaneously anonymous in their numbers and unique in their individuality—the neutral, straightforward, even repetitive quality that treats each of them with similar respect in their everydayness is highly fitting.

On viewing images of a potentially disturbing nature: click here.
While the experience of being on the street, arm-in-arm with other protestors, may have been transformative to those involved, the protests were a bitter and often violent struggle over what road Japan should take, where it should stand in the world, and what place people would have in the workings of their government. In addition to the police, anti-treaty protestors also confronted opposition from right-wing groups.

**Pro-American Demonstrators**

Though far outnumbered by other demonstrators, conservative and pro-American counter-protestors played a conspicuous role during the Anpo protests. Shortly after stepping down as prime minister, Kishi himself was attacked by a right-wing extremist and stabbed multiple times in the leg. Some months after the protests, on October 12, 1960, Asanuma Inejirō, the head of the Japan Socialist Party, was assassinated by a 17-year-old fanatic while giving a public address.
On May 26, three young right-wing assailants threw a bottle filled with ammonia at Socialist Party leaders gathering signatures outside the Diet compound. This foreshadowed the assassination of the head of the Socialist Party, Asanuma Inejirō, several months later.
right: Pro-American youth gather at Haneda airport on June 10 to welcome the delegation led by White House Press Secretary James Hagerty.

[anp7127]

below: They scale a fence to attack anti-treaty protestors whose signs include one declaring “We Dislike Ike” (a reference to President Eisenhower’s campaign slogan).

[anp7128]
Protestors clashed with police on many occasions over May and June, but no day was more fierce than June 15. Planned as a "second May Day," it started with a general strike. A protest march on the Diet began in the afternoon. By 4:00 p.m., a group of around 10,000 students from the mainstream of Zengakuren had gathered near the south gate of the Diet building. By 6:00 p.m., the students had succeeded in prying open the gate and began trying to enter the compound, squeezing between the trucks that had been put there as a barrier. The police fended them off with water cannons, and, around 7:00 p.m., launched a counterattack using clubs to drive the students back. It was sometime during this clash that Tokyo University student Kanba Michiko was killed.

In response to the embarrassment of the Hagerty incident a few days earlier, the government had put the police on high alert and mobilized nearly 3,500 in and around the Diet compound. The clashes between the students and police went back and forth until after midnight, resulting in the arrest of 200 students and the hospitalization of 600 more—including 50 who required over three weeks to recover. [27] Many police were also injured. [28] Hamaya was at the south gate for these clashes and his photographs of them are the single most sustained passage in his book.
June 15

On the evening of June 15, students led by the radical Zengakuren federation forced their way into the Diet compound through the south gate, clashing with police for several hours before they were finally driven out. The violence surrounding this incident, which included police attempts to disperse the demonstrators with fire hoses, became a turning point in the protests. Hundreds of students and scores of police were injured, and one student was killed.

Hamaya’s photographs convey the tension and fury of the June 15 confrontation. Partly due to low light the photos are more blurred than others, but perhaps even because of this they succeed in communicating the shock of the clash and the fluid nature of unfolding events. Many of the shots are taken looking down from where Hamaya stood, either on a ledge or photographer’s ladder. The angle serves to emphasize the dislocation of injury, the isolation of the fallen, and the rawness of the chaos. Protestors are stripped of their shoes and the signs they had been holding—and indeed of their individual identities. This is the only sequence in Hamaya’s coverage of the protests where people are dehumanized and frenzy takes over.
The following photo is the most disturbing of all of Hamaya’s images, and the most remarkable result of his proximity to the June 15 confrontation. Although impossible to verify with complete certainty, it depicts what is probably the body of Kanba Michiko, a female university student and activist, being carried out of the melee. In his autobiography, Hamaya writes that during an exhibition of his photos after the protests, Kanba’s mother informed him directly that it was her daughter in this picture. [29]
The night of June 15 was a turning point in the protests. It led Kishi to cancel President Eisenhower’s visit for fear of the embarrassment that massive protests or some other incident might cause. It also caused an irreparable split among the protestors. The Communist and Socialist Parties had long been critical of Zengakuren’s use of direct action, while the radical students likewise disparaged the two parties’ accommodating behavior, apparently aimed more at preserving their small seat at the table of parliamentary democracy than tackling fundamental problems. The incidents on June 15 and the recriminations that followed were the straw that broke what had always been an uneasy alliance between them. Poet, critic, and friend of the students, Yoshimoto Takaaki, called it the “end of fictions,” an important milestone and symbol in the development of Japan’s student movements of the 1960s. [30]

The events of June 15 also caused a shift in the attitude of the media and public opinion. The violence of the police had until this time kept the media and the public on the side of the students and protestors in general, but the storming of the Diet compound provoked disapproval. In an unprecedented action, all seven of Japan’s major daily newspapers published a joint editorial on June 16 that condemned the use of violence. Though the editorial laid ultimate responsibility for the situation with the
government itself, it was clear to everyone that the students were the primary target of criticism, and the conservatives welcomed the editorial as vindication.

Many protestors, however, were outraged, as was Hamaya himself. His afterword to his published selection of protest photos is an implicit repudiation of the editorial, arguing that violence was already inherent in a political system that excluded citizen’s voices. His photographic representation of the aftermath of June 15 similarly ignores the political fallout, to concentrate instead on the manifestations of grief and mourning they generated. Kanba Michiko would become a martyr, her name still remembered today among members of the Anpo generation. Sociologist and historian Oguma Eiji has argued that people saw in her a personification of the ardent, principled purity of youth, and that her death was a traumatic turning point because it brought back memories of the countless youth lost during the war. [31]

In Hamaya’s photos, the grief on the faces of the students blends into the defeat he records a few days later, the day the treaty went into effect. It is on these faces, and all of the others in the collection, that we can see the connection between the large and the small, the global and the personal, most clearly. Rather than losing the larger picture in detail, it is these details that portray the event as something that happened in the accumulation of individual experiences, simultaneously mundane and extraordinary.

Days of Grief

The days following the violence of June 15 saw many momentous events—a memorial service for Kanba Michiko on June 18, the automatic coming into effect of the revised security treaty on June 19, and a third general strike on June 22. Hamaya’s focus in his final photos was not on confrontation but, above all, on grief and mourning for a dead colleague and a defeated movement. Kanba Michiko would become a martyr, her name still remembered today among members of the Anpo generation.
Hamaya’s caption for this June 15 photo reads: “The news of a female student’s death spread. A few thousand students entered the [Diet] compound which had been yielded by the police. Night fell amidst a light rain. Grief flowed among them. At 9:10, they furled their flags and offered silent prayers to their classmate. The rain grew noticeably stronger.”
Mourners gather in the vicinity of the Diet building on June 16, bringing flowers and creating makeshift shrines in Kanba’s memory.
Kanba Michiko’s portrait as it appeared in a memorial service at the University of Tokyo on June 18.

Kanba’s mother (left) joined students and professors (below) at the June 18 funeral service.
After the June 18 memorial service, students march towards the Diet with Kanba's portrait. This was the last day before the Anpo treaty would pass into law, and the peaceful protests around the Diet were the largest ever, with an estimated 330,000 participants.

[anp7047]
Hamaya’s account of the Anpo protests ends abruptly and ambivalently. Where did these massive protests lead? What did they mean for the future? Hamaya’s final images strike an optimistic note. They are taken during the preparations for the third general strike that month—on June 22, three days after the revised security treaty went into effect—and are some of the most affectionate in the whole collection. Strikers and students bed down together, lean on each other, and sing.

Strikers, students, and other supporters dance and sing on the eve of the general strike on June 22. Collective singing, often accompanied by the accordion, was a central element of the culture of protest in the 1950s.
A sit-in on a train station platform.
The final image in Hamaya’s published selection of protest photographs frames a peaceful march as it advances down a wide avenue directly toward the camera. Hayama’s commentary reads: “Today, the people of Japan joined hands with one another, spread their hands out wide, and set out striding forward in order to continue living as the people of their day. In order to live in a democracy.” The implication is that, although the treaty itself became law, a higher goal might have been achieved. Kishi was being forced from office, and in the process a wide and varied multitude of Japanese people had emerged to defend the principles of democracy. That engagement would continue. This was a common reading of events that Hamaya endorsed at the time, but would soon come to question.

After photographing the June 22 general strike, Hamaya turned his lens away from the popular protests that continued at less intense levels in later months and years, returning only very briefly to the subject of student protest in the late 1960s. His final images of the Anpo struggle, however, strike an optimistic note. This photo, the concluding shot in the collection he published in Japan in August 1960, carries a caption stating that although the protests failed to prevent the new security treaty from going into effect, they succeeded in creating a deeper spirit of grassroots democracy.

But, the optimistic view was not shared by everyone. If some saw the Anpo protests as basically successful, others saw only failure. The protests had failed to stop the revised security treaty, and in the process demonstrated Japanese democracy’s fundamental lack of responsiveness to the voice of the people. This view was most common among student radicals, but it was also shared among some leading intellectuals. For all of the upheaval of the protests, when Kishi stepped down and another member of his party,
Ikeda Hayato, took his place on July 19, political factionalism and money politics returned as they had always done. Nothing had changed.

The Anpo protests did indeed evaporate quickly following the passage of the treaty and Kishi’s resignation. The social movements that had fed into the protest, as well as some that were born during them, would continue into the 1960s and beyond, but no protest would bring together so many different strands of social interest again. The year 1960 marked the beginning of the “income doubling plan,” inaugurated by Prime Minister Ikeda in the wake of the protests. As economic growth and personal incomes soared through the 1960s, many people’s interest shifted away from the politics that had driven the Anpo protests. The year 1960 saw the highest-ever rate of hiring success for college graduates in the postwar period, and a special edition of the weekly magazine Shūkan Bunshun from June 27, 1960 might have been the first to capture the shift in attention with its title, “So the Protests are Over, Let’s Find a Job.”[32]

Whether the Anpo protests were a success or a failure, a beginning or an end, a turning point or a continuation, continue to be questions with many answers. For Hamaya, the outcome of the protests seemed to become increasingly disappointing. After completing his exhausting coverage of the “days of rage and grief,” he took a hiatus from photographing human subjects, one which ended up becoming definitive of his subsequent work. After traveling Japan for four years, he published a collection of nature photography titled Landscapes of Japan (Nihon Rettō), and after this he only rarely photographed human subjects. In the afterword to the collection of landscapes he talked about the reason behind the transition. Speaking of the Anpo protests, he wrote:

_The Japanese, who had passed a long history up until that time as though they had no relation to politics, suddenly showed at this particular moment in history an unexpected and elevated awareness of politics. I thought this was a rare moment of progress. But it was only a passing occurrence. ... the momentary elevation soon fell away. Superficial economic progress came after the political strife. But this kind of unstable peace and prosperity, driven by economic development, was false._

Hamaya’s 1960 book of photos of the protests ends on a positive note; nevertheless, the image of a single forlorn flag, marking dawn on June 19, the day the treaty became law, remains one of the most arresting of the collection. It seems to mark something left undone, a hope or aspiration that did not reach its fulfillment.
June 19, the day the treaty became law.

[anp7183]
SOURCES | NOTES | CREDITS

SOURCES

Photography Source

The images for this unit are digital copies of prints that are housed in Hamaya Hiroshi’s archive. In 2008, filmmaker Linda Hoaglund contacted Tada Tsuguo, manager of the archive, to find out if the prints used to make the 1960 Japanese-language book “Days of Rage and Grief” remained in his possession. Mr. Tada graciously invited her to film them in the archive, where they had been carefully stored, more or less untouched, for half a century.

Bibliography


Hamaya, Hiroshi. Ikari to kanashimi no kiroku (Record of Rage and Grief) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 1960).


NOTES

Chapter 1: Cold War Japan

1. *Snow Country* (Yukiguni) (1956) and *Japan’s Back Coast* (Ura Nihon) (1957) are Hamaya’s signature works. They cemented his reputation in the 1950s and represent major contributions to the history of photography in Japan. In addition to these, he had published *Observations of China* (Mite kita Chūgoku) (1957), *Poetry’s Home* (Shi no furusato) (1958), and *A Children’s Regional Chronicle* (Kodomo fudoki) (1959). Hamaya became a contributing photographer to Magnum in 1961. Contributing photographers were defined as “independent photographers who have been close friends of Magnum,” and included Ansel Adams, Philippe Halsman, Dorothea Lange, Russell Lee, Herbert List, and Wayne Miller. (In Our Time: The World as Seen by Magnum Photographers, p. 454.)


10. Ibid., pp. 115-16.


**Chapter 2: The Confrontation**


20. In Igarashi, p. 136.


**Chapter 3: Sites of Protest**


**Chapter 4: “Average Citizens”**


**Chapter 5: Hope Deferred**


28. According to the statistics of the Metropolitan Police, 815 policemen were injured in the period between June 11 and June 19. Cited in Packard, p. 298.

29. The same photo was also published one year later with a caption identifying the fallen student as Kanba Michiko, on the inside cover of a Zengakuren commemoration of the events of June 15, titled *6.15 / Ware ware no genzai (June 15 / Our Present)*. The editor of the book recalls never receiving any objections to the attribution, suggesting it was correct. The book’s front cover, incidentally, was designed by the artist Nakamura Hiroshi discussed by Linda Hoaglund. The author would like to thank Michiba Chikanobu...
for his assistance in researching this photograph.

30. Quoted in Sasaki-Uemura, p. 44.


32. Quoted in Oguma, p. 547.

CREDITS

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